

Deliverable 4.3

Report on consumer preferences for products from new value chains



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Abstract	Deliverable 4.3 offers an extensive analysis of consumer preferences within new value chains, focusing particularly on short food supply chains. It explores consumer valuation of product proximity and the number of intermediaries, using laboratory experiments and preference surveys. The study finds a general preference for locally produced and directly sourced products but with notable differences across Greece, Spain, Morocco, and Algeria. It delves into the reasons behind these preferences, considering demographic influences and regional trends, providing valuable insights for stakeholders in tailoring products and strategies to diverse consumer segments.
Keywords	Experimental auctions, choice experiments, short supply chains, hypothetical bias, calibration

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Deliverable 4.3 provides a comprehensive analysis of consumer preferences and perceptions regarding products from new value chains with a special focus on short food supply chains. Within this context we explore how consumers value distance from the production area and number of intermediaries. Through a series of laboratory experiments and stated preferences surveys, we find that consumers value products produced closer to them and when they are provided directly from the producer. However, consumers across Greece, Spain, Morocco and Algeria show significant heterogeneity, with Algerian consumers showing the lowest valuation of them all.

The study further delves into the reasons behind these preferences, analyzing factors such as trust, risk and personality traits. The findings suggest that consumers in Europe (Greece and Spain) place a high value on supporting local economies and have a strong preference for environmentally sustainable practices. In contrast, consumers in Algeria are more influenced by price and availability, which might explain their lower valuation of proximity and direct sourcing.

Additionally, the research highlights the impact of demographic factors such as age, income, and education on consumer preferences within these value chains. Younger consumers and those with higher education levels tend to show a greater preference for local and directly sourced products. This information is vital for stakeholders in the food supply chain, including policymakers and marketers, as it provides insights into tailoring products and marketing strategies to different consumer segments in diverse geographical regions.

Emphasis text

Choice Experiment, Auctions, Calibration, Hypothetical bias.

1 INTRODUCTION

In today's economic and environmental landscape, the significance of short food supply chains cannot be overstated. These chains play a pivotal role in reducing carbon emissions, bolstering local economies, and providing consumers with fresher produce. Understanding consumer preferences within these chains is crucial for aligning production and marketing strategies with consumer demands.

Experimental auctions have emerged as a valuable tool in gauging real consumer valuation and willingness to pay. They offer realistic market simulations, though they may face challenges like potential biases or limited external validity. Complementing these, choice experiments allow for the exploration of preferences in hypothetical scenarios. They provide flexibility in testing various attributes but must contend with issues like hypothetical bias.

Profiling consumer preferences is invaluable for gaining marketing insights. By employing these methodologies, businesses can tailor their products and communication strategies to meet the specific needs and desires of different consumer segments. This approach is essential for companies operating within short food supply chains, where consumer preference can vary significantly.

The document progresses by delving into case studies for Greece, Spain, Morocco and Algeria, thus providing a practical perspective. The forthcoming section outlines the methodologies employed, including auctions, choice experiments, and the calibration of hypothetical bias. This is followed by a data analysis segment, where a descriptive analysis precedes an econometric analysis aimed at calibrating Willingness to Pay (WTP) derived from the choice experiments. The report concludes with a final section synthesizing the findings and implications of the study.

2 METHODOLOGY

This section provides an overview of the experimental auctions and choice experiment methodologies, detailing the procedures used across Morocco, Algeria, Greece, and Spain to gather data pertinent to our research objectives. It emphasizes the methods' value in understanding consumer behavior and preferences within new value chains. The section concludes with an in-depth explanation of the calibration method used to refine hypothetical WTP, ensuring accurate and meaningful insights are derived from the research findings.

2.1 EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS

In the marketing and agricultural economics, experimental auctions are a pivotal tool for understanding consumer behavior and valuation of products. Among these, Vickrey auctions, particularly the second-price auction (SPA) and its variants like the Nth price and random Nth price auctions, along with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, are widely utilized.

The second-price auction, operates under a simple principle. Participants submit sealed bids for a product, and while the highest bidder wins the item, they only pay the amount of the second-highest bidder. The dominant strategy for each bidder in a SPA is to bid their true valuation of the item being auctioned. This means that each participant should bid exactly the amount that the item is worth to them, no more and no less. The reason this strategy is dominant in a second-price auction is due to its unique bidding and payment rules. In this type of auction, the highest bidder wins the item, but the price they pay is the second-highest bid, not their own bid. This setup removes the incentive to bid either higher or lower than one's true valuation: a) If a participant bids more than their true valuation and wins, they risk paying a price that is more than the item's worth to them. This would lead to a situation where the winner feels a loss, as they pay more than the item's value to them. b) If a participant bids less than their true valuation, they risk losing the item even though they would have been willing to pay more than the winning bid. This happens because their lower bid might fall below the second-highest bid.

By bidding their true valuation, participants ensure that they only win the item if it is priced at or below what it is worth to them, and they never overpay relative to their own valuation. This characteristic of the second-price auction makes it very efficient in terms



of economic theory, as it leads to a truthful revelation of bidders' valuations and maximizes the chances that the item will go to the person who values it the most.

The BDM mechanism, named after economists Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964), offers another approach to eliciting true valuations. Here, participants state the highest price they are willing to pay for an item. A price is then randomly generated; if this price is less than or equal to the participant's stated value, they purchase the item at this price. If the random price is higher, they do not buy the item. This mechanism effectively forces participants to reveal their true valuation, as setting the price too low risks losing the item, while setting it too high could lead to an overpayment.

These auction methods are particularly useful in understanding consumer behavior in a controlled environment. By analyzing the data from these auctions, researchers can gain insights into how consumers value different attributes of a product, such as brand, quality, or origin. This is especially pertinent in agricultural economics, where factors like organic certification or local sourcing can significantly influence consumer choices. Moreover, these experimental auctions serve as a microcosm of larger market dynamics, allowing researchers to test hypotheses about market behavior, consumer preferences, and the effectiveness of various marketing strategies in a controlled, yet realistic setting. The data and insights gained from these auctions are invaluable in shaping marketing tactics and policies in the broader economic landscape.

2.2 CHOICE EXPERIMENT

The choice experiment methodology is a research technique widely used in various fields such as marketing, environmental/agricultural economics, and healthcare to understand preferences and decision-making processes. This method involves presenting participants with a set of hypothetical scenarios or products, each with a different combination of attributes and levels. For instance, in a study about consumer preferences for a new smartphone, the attributes could include price, screen size, battery life, and brand, with each attribute having several possible levels (e.g., price could be 300, 500, or 700). Participants are then asked to choose their preferred option from each set. This process is repeated multiple times with different combinations of attributes and levels (Louviere et al., 2010).

The design of the choice sets in a choice experiment is crucial and is often based on statistical techniques like fractional factorial designs or D-efficient designs. These designs ensure that the data collected can be used to estimate the utility that participants



derive from each attribute level. The analysis of this data allows researchers to infer the relative importance of different attributes in the decision-making process. For example, it might reveal whether consumers are more sensitive to changes in price or battery life when choosing a smartphone. Advanced models like multinomial logit, nested logit, or mixed logit can be used to analyze the data, providing insights into how changes in product attributes might influence consumer choices.

Choice experiments have several advantages. They enable the study of preferences for non-market goods (like environmental changes or health outcomes), which are difficult to evaluate using actual market data. This method also allows for the exploration of preferences for products or services that do not yet exist, helping in new product development and policy simulation. However, there are challenges, such as ensuring that respondents understand and engage with the hypothetical scenarios and mitigating the potential for hypothetical bias. Incentive compatibility is particularly relevant in distinguishing between hypothetical and actual willingness to pay (WTP), a phenomenon known as hypothetical bias. The design of the choice tasks, the context of the goods being valued, and the payment vehicle used are all essential factors in achieving incentive compatibility. For instance, ensuring incentive compatibility necessitates that participants not only perceive their choices as having real-world consequences but also trust that policymakers will utilize the gathered data in a manner that upholds the independence of each choice set and directly correlates the options presented in these sets with potential policy implementations (Vossler et al., 2012).

Despite these challenges, the choice experiment methodology remains a powerful tool for understanding complex decision-making processes and quantifying the value of various attributes in a choice context.

2.3 EXPERIMENTAL METHODS

The laboratory experiments were conducted in the laboratories of CREDA and AUA, in Castelldefels and Athens respectively. In Athens, subjects were recruited by a professional research company. In Spain, a mixture of methods were utilized. Subjects were recruited with the understanding that they will participate in a research study of approximately one hour at the university campus. In all, we have complete observations from 304 subjects in Athens and 296 subjects in Castelldefels. Sessions were spread over weekdays and throughout the morning and afternoon hours, in order to accommodate respondents with various time schedules. The experiment was fully computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and zBrac was used to translate the standardised English version to Greek and Catalan (Saral and Schroter, 2019).

Subjects were offered a fixed fee to participate in the study and they were unaware of additional rewards that were available. They were only informed for these additional rewards once they entered the study. The experimenter first read aloud a welcome note and gave an overview of the structure of the study. All instructions were computerized and subjects could go through instructions at their own pace, with the exception of auction instructions that were given just before the auction started using slides that were shared on every subject's laptop computer (see Appendix: Experimental Instructions for the Auction). Subjects were also specifically instructed to raise their hand and ask any questions in private and that the experimenter would then share her answer with the group.

The experiment consisted of three stages. In Stage 1 subjects went through a typical real effort task adopted from (Abeler et al., 2011) where they had to count and report the number of zeros shown in a 4x4 matrix. This task was repeated 10 times (the elements of the matrix where random and changed with each period but were the same for all subjects at a given period) and subjects could earn $0.5 \in$ every time they correctly solved the task within 20 seconds. The task aimed at mitigating house money effects (e.g., Corgnet et al., 2014; Jacquemet et al., 2009) by making subjects earn part of their endowment. The task was purposefully made easy, so that subjects would start off in Stage 2 of the experiment with approximately equal endowments.

In Stage 2 subjects participated in a series of 2nd price Vickrey auctions (Vickrey, 1961) and the vast majority of groups consisted of 4 subjects. The size of the groups was always displayed to subjects. Matching in groups was random and remained the same throughout the session. Subjects were unaware of which other subjects in the session composed their group. The subjects were told that only one subject from each group would be the person for which any decisions would be binding. Thus, payments for this experiment use the Between-Subject Random Incentivized Scheme (BRIS) where only a fraction of subjects realize their choices. The purpose of BRIS is to keep logistics and incentives manageable since our experiment involved having the actual products available for tasting and possible purchase from subjects. The merits of BRIS and a practical application with steaks on a US-wide value elicitation experiment are discussed in Ahles et al. (2023).

The mechanics of the auction were explained by the experimenter using several examples. In order to ensure that the procedure was fully understood, a hypothetical training round for two non-focal products was conducted and then subjects went through a series of review questions. Bids were entered simultaneously for the two goods. The purpose of the training rounds was to closely mimic the real auctions rounds that followed.

Right after the training rounds, subjects went through three within-subjects treatments and rounds of bidding: the Visual, the Information and the Sensory treatment. In the first treatment, no information were provided for the fig jams and subjects would only be shown pictures of the fig jams when they bid (Visual treatment). In the second round, subjects received information about the fig jams: whether the jams were purchased from a producer or an intermediary and whether the jams were produced closer or further away from the auction site i.e., the laboratory.

Moreover, we designed a Choice Experiment (CE) which was common for all countries (Greece, Spain, Morocco, Algeria). According to the experimental design of the choice experiment, participants encounter decision scenarios where they must choose between two primary alternatives or opt for a "none-of-the-above" option. The alternatives differ based on three attributes: the distance from production, the number of intermediaries, and the price in euros. The distance attribute assesses consumer preference for products closer to their production source versus those further away. The number of intermediaries involves choosing between direct purchases from the producer, implying no intermediaries, and purchases through a retailer, which include multiple intermediaries. This attribute helps gauge preferences for direct versus indirect purchasing channels. Price is a critical factor, varied across five levels (3, 4.5, 6, 7.5, 9 euros), offering insights into how price sensitivity influences consumer choices. The design, comprising 10 distinct choice sets, provides a comprehensive understanding of how these attributes individually and collectively impact consumer decision-making.

In Greece and Spain the CE was administered in the lab right after the auction. That is, for subjects that participated in the lab experiment we elicited both their response in the incentivized auction as well as their responses in the hypothetical CE. Subjects in Algeria and Morocco responded only to the hypothetical CE.

2.4 CALIBRATION OF HYPOTHETICAL BIAS

In this research design, a comprehensive approach was adopted to analyze consumer behavior and preferences across different cultural and economic settings, specifically focusing on Greece, Spain, Algeria, and Morocco. The methodology involved two distinct but related components: an incentivized auction and a hypothetical Choice Experiment (CE). In Greece and Spain, participants engaged in both components during a lab-based experiment. Initially, they participated in an incentivized auction, where their bidding behavior was observed and recorded. This auction provided real economic incentives, thus capturing incentivized market behavior and preferences. Following the auction, the same subjects were presented with a hypothetical CE. This CE involved a



series of choices among various hypothetical scenarios or products, each with different combinations of attributes. The purpose of this sequential approach was to obtain a comprehensive understanding of consumer preferences and valuations in a controlled environment.

The process in Algeria and Morocco, however, was different. Here, participants were only exposed to the hypothetical CE. This part of the study did not involve any real monetary transactions or incentivized auctions. Instead, participants responded to various hypothetical scenarios, similar to those presented in Greece and Spain. This approach was designed to elicit their preferences and valuations based solely on hypothetical situations. The decision to use only the CE component in Algeria and Morocco stems from logistical considerations and our inability to run laboratory experiments.

The contrast in methodologies between the two sets of countries (Greece and Spain versus Algeria and Morocco) provided a unique opportunity to study and calibrate hypothetical bias – a phenomenon where responses in hypothetical scenarios (like CEs) differ from those in actual decision-making situations (like incentivized auctions). Hypothetical bias is a well-documented issue in economic research, where individuals often display different preferences in non-consequential (hypothetical) settings compared to consequential (real) ones. By comparing responses from the incentivized auctions in Greece and Spain to the hypothetical CEs in the same countries, we are able to quantify this bias. This comparison would reveal the extent to which hypothetical scenarios accurately reflect actual market behavior.

The insights gained from Greece and Spain can then be used to adjust and calibrate the responses obtained from the hypothetical CEs in Algeria and Morocco. This calibration is crucial to account for the hypothetical bias identified in the initial phase of the study. By applying the hypothetical bias gap measured in Greece and Spain, we aimed to make the CE responses from Algeria and Morocco more representative of what might be expected in a real-world setting. This adjustment was a critical step in ensuring that the findings were robust and could be generalized across different contexts, particularly when direct comparisons of real and hypothetical scenarios were not available in the latter countries.

The combination of incentivized auctions and CEs provided a rich dataset for analysis, offering valuable insights into how people from different regions value goods and services. This approach also highlighted the challenges and complexities involved in conducting cross-cultural economic research, particularly in terms of ensuring comparability and adjusting for biases inherent in different experimental methods.



2.5 ECONOMETRIC MODELS

We first start by estimating linear mixed effects models with random coefficients to capture bidding behavior of participants. Linear mixed models are models containing both fixed effects and random effects. They are a generalization of linear regression allowing for the inclusion of random deviations (effects) other than those associated with the overall error term. In matrix notation,

$$\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{Z}\mathbf{u} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \tag{1}$$

where y is the $n \times 1$ vector of responses, **X** is an $n \times p$ design/covariate matrix for the fixed effects β , and **Z** is the $n \times q$ design/covariate matrix for the random effects u. The $n \times 1$ vector of errors ε is assumed to be multivariate normal with mean 0 and variance matrix $\sigma_{\varepsilon}^2 \mathbf{R}$. The fixed portion of (1), $\mathbf{X}\beta$, is analogous to the linear predictor from a standard OLS regression model with β being the regression coefficients to be estimated. For the random portion of (1), $\mathbf{Z}\mathbf{u} + \varepsilon$, we assume that u has variance–covariance matrix **G** and that u is orthogonal to ε so that

$$\operatorname{Var} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{u} \\ \mathbf{\varepsilon} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{G} & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} & \sigma_{\varepsilon}^{2} \mathbf{R} \end{bmatrix}$$

The random effects u are not directly estimated (although they may be predicted), but instead are characterized by the elements of **G**, known as variance components, that are estimated along with the overall residual variance σ_{ε}^2 and the residual-variance parameters that are contained within **R**.

The key to fitting mixed models lies in estimating the variance components, and for that the most popular method is Maximum Likelihood. In our context, y is the bid amount for the auctioned item. The "random" aspect of these models allows for the variability in the influence of independent variables (such as bidder characteristics, item attributes, or auction conditions) across different bidders or auctions.

This approach acknowledges that not all participants react identically to the same factors; for instance, two bidders might value the same attribute of an auctioned item differently. By incorporating random coefficients, the model can account for this heterogeneity in preferences and strategies among bidders. This leads to a more nuanced understanding of the auction dynamics and can provide insights into how different



variables contribute to the variability in bids. Such models are particularly useful in cases where bidder behavior is expected to vary significantly due to personal preferences, strategic considerations, or differing perceptions of the auctioned item's value. By regressing bids on the treatment variables and allowing for random coefficients, we can get individual level predictions of subjects' WTP in Greece and Spain.

In the econometric estimation of the choice experiment, we apply a random utility model where each alternative's utility for a respondent in a given choice situation is the sum of a deterministic component V and a stochastic component ε . The deterministic part is modeled as a linear function of the attributes' values (X) from the experimental design, including distance from production, number of intermediaries, and price, and their associated marginal utilities (β). As a result, the utility from the j^{th} alternative of respondent n in choice situation s is given by:

$$U_{nsj} = V_{nsj} + \varepsilon_{nsj}$$
, where $V_{nsj} = \sum_{k=1}^{N_j} \beta_{nk} X_{nsjk}$

For this specific design, the parameters associated with the distance from production and the number of intermediaries are assumed to follow a normal distribution, reflecting the variability and heterogeneity in individual preferences regarding these attributes. In contrast, the parameter for price is considered fixed, signifying a consistent valuation of price changes across respondents.

Using a Conditional Logit model, we can estimate the parameters based on stated choices. This model calculates the probability of selecting a particular alternative as a function of its utility, relative to the total utility of all available choices. In particular, the probability assigned to the individual n choosing alternative j (makes choice j_n) when the choice set contains choices j = 1, ..., J, is :

$$\Pr(j_n|J_n, X_{nj}) = \frac{e^{V_{nsj}}}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} e^{V_{nsj}}}$$

However, to account for the limitations of the Conditional Logit model, such as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption and ignoring heterogeneity in preferences, we employ the Mixed Logit (ML) model. This model accommodates the random distribution of parameters for distance and intermediaries, capturing individual differences in preferences. During the estimation, we focus on estimating taste parameters directly in the willingness-to-pay (WTP) space, particularly for the normally

distributed attributes of distance and intermediaries. This model has been found to be more behaviorally plausible than the one in preference space (Hensher and Greene, 2011; Train and Weeks, 2005). Assuming separability of V_{njt} in the price attribute (P) and the rest of the attributes, this is done by specifying V_{njt} as:

$$V_{njt} = -\beta_{c,n} \left[P_{nk} + \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} WTP_{nk} X_{nsjk} \right]$$

This reparameterization allows us to derive more behaviorally plausible WTP estimates for these attributes, offering deeper insights into how variations in proximity to production and the number of intermediaries, influence consumer preferences and decision-making. This is crucial for effective marketing strategies, supply chain decisions, and pricing policies.

Also, it results in a set of individual WTP values for each attribute which are similar to the ones estimated by the individual level predictions of subjects' WTP in Greece and Spain estimated from their bids in the Experimental auctions. As a result, we can regress the absolute relative difference of the predictions we get from the two methods (i.e., auctions and CE) on a wide set of characteristics.



3 DATA

We collected responses from 304, 296, 310 and 380 subjects in Greece, Spain, Algeria and Morocco respectively. Besides the auction data and the CE data, subjects went through a questionnaire to elicit their demographics and a wide area of preferences such as risk-taking, time discounting, trust, altruism and positive/negative reciprocity and a short questionnaire for personality. Questions for the Big Five personality scales were taken from Gosling et al. (2023) and the rest of the preference questions were taken from Falk et al. (2023). A copy of the questions and scales are shown in the Appendix.

3.1 DEMOGRAPHICS, ATTITUDES AND PREFERENCES: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Table 1 indicates descriptive statistics for the variables elicited through the questionnaire part of the studies across countries. It offers an intriguing comparison of selected demographics, personality traits, and behaviors such as risk, discounting, altruism, and attitudes across Greece, Spain, Algeria, and Morocco. A notable observation is the similarity between the Greek and Spanish samples, which appear more comparable to each other than to the Algerian and Moroccan samples.

In terms of demographics, Greek and Spanish participants show close alignment in household size, with averages of 2.78 and 3.36 respectively, compared to the larger household sizes in Algeria and Morocco, both averaging above 3.39. Education levels in Greece (3.22) and Spain (2.99) are also higher than in Algeria (2.53) and Morocco (2.94), reflecting a trend towards higher educational attainment in the European countries. Similarly, income levels follow this pattern, with Greece at 3.31 and Spain at 3.54, markedly higher than the figure in Algeria (2.78).

Personality traits, including extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness, exhibit parallel trends between Greece and Spain. For example, extraversion scores are 9.15 in Greece and 8.23 in Spain, both higher than in Algeria (7.99). This suggests a more outgoing and open social demeanor in the European Mediterranean context which is similar to Morocco. Agreeableness shows a similar pattern, with Greece scoring 11.43 and Spain 10.51, compared to lower scores in Algeria (8.66) and Morocco (8.03).

Looking at risk-taking, Greece averages 6.73 and Spain 6.20, indicating a higher propensity for risk-taking compared to Algeria (5.83) and Morocco (5.97). Time discounting follows a similar trend, with Greeks scoring 5.99 and Catalans 7.01, both of which are higher than the scores in Algeria (5.07) and Morocco (5.67). Altruism, as reflected in donation amounts, shows Greeks donating an average of 189.46 euros and Spaniards 157.74 euros, which are considerably higher than the averages in Algeria (106.58 euros) and Morocco (73.36 euros).

Attitudes towards jam consumption and SFSC also reveal interesting similarities between Greece and Spain. For instance, the frequency of jam consumption is relatively close, with Greece at 2.56 and Spain at 2.21, compared to higher frequencies in Morocco (3.28). In the context of SFSC attitudes, both Greece and Spain show a relatively high interest, with scores of 11.04 and 11.68 respectively, compared to 9.62 in Algeria and 14.03 in Morocco. These figures highlight not only the cultural and lifestyle similarities between Greek and Catalan participants but also the contrasting patterns observed in the North African samples.

			Country			
						Test
	Greece	Spain	Algeria	Morocco	Total	statistic
Gender	1.59 (0.51)	1.58 (0.54)	1.60 (0.49)	1.43 (0.50)	1.54 (0.51)	< 0.001
Household size	2.78 (1.25)	3.36 (1.29)	3.39 (1.51)	3.40 (1.60)	3.24 (1.45)	< 0.001
Education level	3.22 (1.31)	2.99 (0.86)	2.53 (1.02)	2.94 (1.00)	2.92 (1.08)	< 0.001
Income level	3.31 (0.74)	3.54 (0.70)	2.78 (1.14)	3.33 (0.97)	3.24 (0.95)	< 0.001
Working status	2.53 (1.71)	2.91 (1.59)	3.33 (1.98)	2.63 (1.78)	2.84 (1.80)	< 0.001
Risk taking	6.73 (2.20)	6.20 (2.22)	5.83 (2.55)	5.97 (2.64)	6.17 (2.45)	< 0.001
Time Discounting	5.99 (2.53)	7.01 (2.22)	5.07 (1.82)	5.67 (2.42)	5.91 (2.37)	< 0.001
Trust	5.42 (2.84)	6.17 (2.70)	4.95 (2.59)	5.13 (2.37)	5.40 (2.66)	< 0.001
Altruism	7.93 (1.94)	7.60 (1.89)	7.51 (2.88)	6.39 (2.33)	7.30 (2.38)	< 0.001
Altruism - donation						
amount	189.46 (171.28)	157.74 (193.37)	106.58 (118.37)	73.36 (157.07)	128.06 (167.90)	< 0.001
Positive reciprocity	9.33 (1.02)	9.16 (1.29)	5.60 (2.96)	6.02 (2.55)	7.42 (2.75)	< 0.001
Negative reciprocity -						
Willing to punish	5.98 (3.11)	5.69 (2.73)	4.75 (2.96)	5.68 (2.45)	5.53 (2.84)	< 0.001
Negative reciprocity –						
take revenge	3.17 (2.92)	2.96 (2.69)	4.17 (3.04)	5.09 (2.38)	3.93 (2.88)	< 0.001
Do you like jam?	4.12 (0.75)	4.05 (0.84)	3.44 (1.29)	3.84 (1.02)	3.86 (1.03)	< 0.001
Type of breakfast:						
Sweet	142 (46.71%)	139 (46.96%)	20 (6.45%)	82 (21.58%)	383 (29.69%)	
Salty	69 (22.7%)	102 (34.46%)	52 (16.77%)	118 (31.05%)	341 (26.43%)	
Just coffee	77 (25.33%)	41 (13.85%)	161 (51.94%)	142 (37.37%)	421 (32.64%)	
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of demographics per country

No breakfast	16 (5.26%)	14 (4.73%)	77 (24.84%)	38 (10%)	145 (11.24%)	
Jam consumption						
frequency	2.56 (1.04)	2.21 (1.06)	2.37 (1.49)	3.28 (1.14)	2.65 (1.27)	< 0.001
Jams are unhealthy	3.29 (0.92)	3.57 (1.01)	5.51 (1.87)	3.51 (1.84)	3.95 (1.74)	< 0.001
Age	43.88 (13.46)	32.56 (15.00)	30.68 (9.04)	32.90 (10.03)	34.88 (13.01)	< 0.001
Personality:						
Extraversion	9.15 (2.78)	8.23 (2.66)	7.99 (2.56)	8.56 (2.48)	8.49 (2.65)	< 0.001
Agreeableness	11.43 (2.03)	10.51 (2.22)	8.66 (2.67)	8.03 (2.38)	9.56 (2.72)	< 0.001
Conscientiousness	11.51 (2.28)	10.55 (2.62)	8.95 (2.79)	9.35 (2.33)	10.04 (2.69)	< 0.001
Emotional stability	9.70 (2.45)	9.38 (2.85)	7.40 (2.93)	8.01 (2.15)	8.58 (2.75)	< 0.001
Openness	11.27 (2.18)	10.47 (2.29)	8.46 (2.70)	8.99 (2.12)	9.74 (2.58)	< 0.001
SFSC attitudes	11.04 (2.17)	11.68 (1.74)	9.62 (1.92)	14.03 (12.06)	11.71 (6.88)	< 0.001
SFSC intentions	10.94 (2.06)	11.12 (2.10)	10.22 (1.87)	11.29 (5.94)	10.91 (3.66)	< 0.001
Ν	304	296	310	380	1290	

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. SFSC stands for short-food-supply-chain.

3.2 HEDONIC SCORES

Before each auction round subjects had to evaluate the jams based on their visual appearance and the information received. Figure 1a shows that for Greek consumers the jam purchased from the Distant location was generally evaluated more favourably than the one produced in the Closer location. Providing information and having subjects taste the product did not impact hedonic scores in a meaningful way. Figure 1b on the other hand shows that providing information about the number of intermediaries had a significant impact on product evaluation. In general, a product known to be procured directly from the producer shifts hedonic scores in the expected direction.

Figure 1: Hedonic score valuations by treatment for Greek consumers





Catalan consumers exhibit a preference for the jam produced at a closer distance and this evaluation did not shift significantly after providing information about it and tasting the product (Figure 2a). In contrast to Greek consumers, Catalan consumers did not seem to

be significantly affected by information about the number of intermediaries as shown in Figure 2b.







3.3 AUCTION DATA

Figure 3 graphs kernel density estimators of bids for the Greek sample of consumers as well as displays Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of the distributions (Kolmogorov, 1933; Smirnov, 1933).

Figure 3a shows that the Distant and Closer treatments differ across the Visual, Information and Sensory treatments for the Greek sample. Given, however, that information about distant/closer where not available in the first round of the Visual treatment, we are obliged to attribute this effect to a biased estimate, most likely a failure of randomization to treatment (Briz et al., 2017). As a comparison, Figure 4a shows the absence of a difference between the distant/closer treatments in the Catalan sample indicating that the Distant attribute has a small or no effect on elicited valuations.



Figure 3: Kernel density estimators for bids by treatment for Greek consumers



Figures 3b and 4b graphically show the distribution of bids for the products purchased directly from a producer or an intermediary. Both the Greek and Catalan samples show that these effects are likely small, at least in this unconditional analysis.





Figure 4: Kernel density estimators for bids by treatment for Catalan consumers





4 RESULTS

In this section, we present the results in three subsections. First, we discuss results from the auction data for Greece and Spain. We then use the CE data from Greece and Spain to quantify the extent of hypothetical bias and calibrate estimated WTP values from the data we collected in Morocco and Algeria.

4.1 CONSUMER VALUATION (GREECE, SPAIN)

In this section, we analyze the auction data using mixed effects models. Table 2 shows regression results by country (Greece, Spain) as well as a pooled model. Model



specifications use several interaction terms to capture non-linearities in treatment effect which makes interpretation harder. To facilitate interpretation, Figure 5a graphically represents marginal effects for the Closer distance variable. Results from this figure show a differential effect between Greek and Catalan consumers which may be related to the jams themselves as these were jams from different producers. In general, consumers valued less the jam being produced at a closer distance to Athens and Catalan consumers valued more the jam being produced at a closer distance. Information and Taste treatments did not significantly affect valuations.

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Greece		Spain		Pooled	
Constant	1.68^{**}	(0.84)	2.24^{*}	(1.30)	2.63^{***}	(0.95)
Closer	-0.62***	(0.13)	-0.11	(0.11)	-0.36***	(0.08)
Producer	0.11	(0.11)	0.12	(0.11)	0.11	(0.08)
R2: Information	0.29^{***}	(0.09)	0.13	(0.09)	0.22^{***}	(0.07)
R3: Taste	0.36***	(0.11)	0.03	(0.10)	0.20^{***}	(0.07)
Closer x R2	-0.05	(0.13)	0.33^{***}	(0.11)	0.14	(0.08)
Closer x R3	-0.09	(0.14)	0.40^{***}	(0.12)	0.16^{*}	(0.09)
Producer x R2	0.12	(0.12)	0.04	(0.13)	0.08	(0.09)
Producer x R3	-0.07	(0.14)	0.24^{*}	(0.14)	0.08	(0.10)
Gender:						
Female	0.21	(0.16)	-0.38	(0.29)	-0.16	(0.21)
Other	0.55	(0.53)	-0.57	(0.50)	-0.22	(0.33)
Age	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.01**	(0.01)	-0.01***	(0.00)
Household size	-0.07	(0.05)	-0.02	(0.07)	-0.06	(0.05)
Education						
Secondary school degree	-0.17	(0.45)	0.34	(0.43)	0.28	(0.26)
or equivalent						
Bachelor's degree	0.05	(0.47)	0.34	(0.41)	0.28	(0.25)
Master's degree	-0.08	(0.38)	0.37	(0.45)	0.30	(0.26)
Doctorate	0.77	(0.99)	0.49	(0.46)	0.38	(0.35)
Economic position						
Bad	0.56^{*}	(0.31)	0.92	(0.61)	0.59^{**}	(0.25)
Neither good, nor bad	0.82^{***}	(0.28)	1.08^{**}	(0.48)	0.82^{***}	(0.22)
Good	0.92^{***}	(0.30)	1.07^{**}	(0.47)	0.90^{***}	(0.24)
Very good	0.76	(0.55)	1.41**	(0.57)	1.15***	(0.42)
Risk	0.13***	(0.04)	0.07	(0.06)	0.06	(0.04)

Table 2: Regressions of bids

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Time Discounting	-0.08**	(0.04)	0.07	(0.05)	0.01	(0.04)
Trust	-0.03	(0.03)	-0.03	(0.04)	-0.02	(0.03)
Altruism: share	-0.00	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)	0.03	(0.04)
Positive reciprocity	0.08	(0.06)	-0.05	(0.07)	-0.03	(0.05)
Negative reciprocity	-0.01	(0.03)	-0.05	(0.03)	-0.03	(0.02)
Personality						
Extraversion	-0.00	(0.03)	0.06	(0.04)	0.04	(0.03)
Agreeableness	-0.05	(0.05)	0.12^{**}	(0.05)	0.06	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	-0.04	(0.04)	-0.14***	(0.05)	-0.07**	(0.03)
Emotional stability	0.01	(0.03)	-0.10*	(0.05)	-0.05	(0.04)
Openness	-0.00	(0.04)	-0.11**	(0.05)	-0.08^{*}	(0.04)
SFSC attitudes	-0.03	(0.05)	0.17^{**}	(0.09)	0.08	(0.06)
SFSC intentions	0.12^{**}	(0.06)	-0.11	(0.11)	-0.01	(0.08)
Spain					-0.46***	(0.14)
Ν	1824		1776		3600	

Standard errors in parentheses. * p\$<\$0.1, ** p\$<\$0.05 *** p\$<\$0.01.

Figure 5b shows the effect of the jam being procured directly by the producer vs by an intermediary. Both Greek and Catalan consumers value more a jam being procured directly from the producer.

With respect to the rest of the controls in the models, demographics do not exert significant effects: In Spain, age is negatively related to a premium for the fig jams; income is positively related to a premium; risk and time discounting are positively and negatively related to WTP for the Greek sample only; personality traits are not correlated to the WTP in the Greek sample but can explain WTP in Spain; positive SFSC attitudes and intentions explain WTP for the fig jams.







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(b) Effect of Producer (vs. intermediary)

4.2 CHOICE EXPERIMENTS AND CALIBRATION OF HYPOTHETICAL BIAS

The constraints associated with conducting laboratory experiments in Morocco and Algeria necessitated the use of online Choice Experiments instead. Considering the well-documented presence of hypothetical bias in stated Choice Experiments (CE) (Hensher, 2010; Haghani, 2010), our strategy to mitigate this bias involved quantifying it by integrating revealed preference methods with stated preference methods. Consequently, subjects in Greece and Spain who participated in a laboratory experiment also completed a stated CE, which was consistently designed across all four countries in our study.

Our methodology is structured in the following stages: Initially, we estimated mixed logit models with random coefficients for the attributes "No intermediaries" and "Near distance". While the detailed results of these estimations are included in the Appendix, their detailed interpretation is not crucial for understanding our process of calibrating hypothetical bias. The key outcome from these models is the individual-level predictions of Willingness to Pay (WTP) for the attributes of Intermediaries and Distance from the production area. Crucially, we derived these predictions specifically for subjects from Greece and Spain, for whom we also have data on their revealed WTP from the auction.

Subsequently, we employed mixed effects models to analyze the auction bids in relation to the treatment variables, incorporating random coefficients. This approach enabled us to obtain individual-level WTP estimates for participants in Greece and Spain. Since we have corresponding individual-level predictions from the Choice Experiment (CE), we calculated the relative differences using the formula: (WTPsp - WTPrp) / WTPsp, where 'sp' denotes stated preferences and 'rp' represents revealed preferences. Our data revealed that, for Spanish subjects, the estimated WTP from the CE is approximately 68.7% and 66.2% higher than the revealed preferences for the distance and intermediary attributes, respectively. In the case of Greek participants, the relative differences are 18.6% and 63.2% for the same attributes.

In the next phase, we applied seemingly unrelated regression models (Zellner, 1962, 1963; Zellner and Huang, 1962), utilizing the calculated relative differences of the distance and intermediary attributes as dependent variables, against a comprehensive set of demographic, attitudinal, personality and other available variables. Following this, we predicted the relative differences between stated and revealed preferences for an out-of-sample population. These predictions were then used to calibrate and derive adjusted



WTP values for subjects in Morocco and Algeria, ensuring a more accurate reflection of their preferences.

Table 3 show the results of these estimations. Both for Algeria and Morocco, certain demographic factors like "Age" and "Household size" show significant impacts on willingness to pay (WTP) values. For example, in Algeria, "Age" shows a positive impact (coefficients of 0.43* and 0.31*), while "Household size" has a significant negative effect across all WTP values for both countries.

The impact of education level on WTP is quite pronounced, especially in Algeria. Individuals with "Secondary school degree or equivalent" and "Master's degree" show significantly higher WTP values for both the Distance and Intermediaries attributes.

Income categories exhibit varied impacts across the two samples. In Algeria, higher income levels generally show a negative effect on WTP (e.g., "Income: Very good" has coefficients of -82.83*** and -59.49***). In Morocco, the pattern is less consistent, with some income levels showing no significant effect.

Personality traits such as "Extraversion", "Agreeableness", and "Emotional Stability" show significant effects in different conditions. For instance, "Extraversion" is positively correlated with WTP in Algeria (coefficients of 9.13*** and 6.56***). "SFSC attitudes" and "SFSC intent" are positively associated with WTP across all conditions.

Variables like "Risk", "Time discounting", "Trust", "Altruism", "Positive reciprocity", and "Negative reciprocity" also show varied impacts. For example, "Risk" is positively correlated with WTP in all conditions, while "Time discounting" shows a negative impact in Morocco.

	Algeria Near distance	Algeria No intermediaries	Morocco Near distance	Morocco No intermediaries
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Males	3.26	2.34	0.87	-6.20
	(4.36)	(3.13)	(2.83)	(4.26)
Age	0.43^{*}	0.31*	0.01	-0.05
-	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Household size	-46.21***	-33.19***	-5.35***	-8.09***
	(1.52)	(1.09)	(0.96)	(1.44)
Secondary	140.52***	100.92***	9.54	19.14*
school degree				
or equivalent				

Table 3: SU regressions on demographic, attitudinal and personality variables of calibrated WTP values

	(6.22)	(4.46)	(6.87)	(10.35)
Bachelor's	56.31***	40.44***	-5.91	18.49*
degree				
C	(6.25)	(4.49)	(6.88)	(10.36)
Master's degree	108.48^{***}	77.91***	6.58	28.58***
C	(7.84)	(5.63)	(7.36)	(11.09)
Doctorate	26.45**	19.00**	-11.48	14.91
	(11.46)	(8.23)	(8.47)	(12.76)
Income: Bad	83.19***	59.74***	0.38	12.22
	(6.66)	(4.78)	(7.80)	(11.75)
Income:	-25.02***	-17.97***	-5.41	-2.63
Medium				
	(7.20)	(5.17)	(5.96)	(8.98)
Income: Good	-34.17***	-24.55***	-9.91*	-7.53
	(8.08)	(5.80)	(5.95)	(8.96)
Income: Very	-82.83***	-59.49***	-13.18*	-4.01
good				
8	(9.17)	(6.59)	(6.94)	(10.46)
Risk	24.12***	17.32***	3.06***	3.02***
	(0.88)	(0.63)	(0.58)	(0.87)
Time	0.75	0.54	0.83	-2.57***
discounting				,
	(1.10)	(0.79)	(0.64)	(0.96)
Trust	-8.36***	-6.00***	-1.07	0.26
	(0.78)	(0.56)	(0.67)	(1.00)
Altruism	13.66***	9.81***	2.48***	-1.42
	(0.70)	(0.50)	(0.69)	(1.04)
Positive	-0.79	-0.57	0.44	-1.24
reciprocity				
	(0.69)	(0.50)	(0.61)	(0.92)
Negative	-6.57***	-4.72***	-1.41**	-1.58*
reciproctv				
	(0.65)	(0.46)	(0.61)	(0.92)
Personality:				
Extraversion	9.13***	6.56***	-0.25	2.11**
2	(0.75)	(0.54)	(0.62)	(0.93)
Agreeableness	1.31*	0.94*	0.01	1.68*
0	(0.73)	(0.52)	(0.65)	(0.97)
Conscientiousn	-3.34***	-2.40***	-0.23	-0.66
ess	•		=0	
	(0.70)	(0.50)	(0.64)	(0.96)
Emotional	9.85***	7.07***	1.33*	1.01
Stability	2.00	,	2.00	

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	(0.66)	(0.47)	(0.72)	(1.08)
Openness	8.21***	5.89***	-0.26	1.52
	(0.71)	(0.51)	(0.72)	(1.09)
SFSC attitudes	11.86***	8.52***	1.07^{***}	2.12***
	(0.98)	(0.70)	(0.27)	(0.41)
SFSC intent	15.63***	11.23***	1.67^{***}	1.90^{**}
	(0.98)	(0.71)	(0.54)	(0.81)
Constant	2.43***	0.001	44.90^{**}	22.92
	(0.60)	(0.01)	(17.60)	(26.51)
N	310		359	

Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 4 presents the average Willingness to Pay (WTP) by country for the attributes "Distance" and "Intermediaries". The table is divided into two sections: the lower panel displays WTPs in the local currencies of Dirhams for Morocco and Dinars for Algeria, while the upper panel converts these values to Euros, using exchange rates of 1 Euro = 10.95 Dinars and 1 Euro = 148.42 Dirhams.

The calculated values indicate that the attribute "Closer distance" is most highly valued in Spain, with Morocco's and Greece's subjects following closely in their valuation. In contrast, participants in Algeria assign the lowest value to this attribute. Regarding the "Number of intermediaries", Greek subjects exhibit the highest preference for purchasing directly from the producer, with Spanish participants showing a similar but slightly lower preference. Moroccan participants also value this attribute, though to a lesser extent, while Algerian subjects demonstrate the lowest valuation among the four countries.

Table 4: Average pr	redicted (cali	brated) WTPs
---------------------	----------------	--------------

			Country		
	Greece	Spain	Algeria	Morocco	Total
Ν	304	296	310	380	1290
Close distance	6.17 (2.96)	9.83 (2.57)	4.05 (0.83)	7.87 (3.29)	6.99 (3.35)
No intermediaries	9.36 (2.99)	8.91 (3.00)	2.91 (0.59)	7.66 (4.74)	7.20 (4.12)
Close distance			601.46 (122.54)	86.19 (36.07)	
No intermediaries			431.95 (88.01)	83.86 (51.88)	

Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. For Greece and Spain, WTPs are derived from the auction data. For Morocco and Algeria, WTPs are derived from the CE after being calibrated for hypothetical bias.

5 CONCLUSIONS

This research has successfully explored consumer preferences within new value chains, with a focus on short food supply chains, across diverse regions. Through experimental auctions and choice experiments, we've uncovered significant variations in how consumers value product proximity and direct sourcing. Our findings reveal a clear preference for locally produced goods and products sourced directly from producers in European contexts, contrasted with a focus on price and availability in North African regions. The study offers critical insights for tailoring products and marketing strategies to align with consumer demands in different cultural and economic settings.

6 DISCUSSION

The study's results contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics within short food supply chains. The evident heterogeneity in consumer preferences across Greece, Spain, Morocco, and Algeria underscores the importance of cultural and economic factors in shaping consumer behavior. The differential valuation of product attributes like proximity and direct sourcing offers valuable marketing insights, particularly in the context of global sustainability trends and the push toward local economies. Future research could expand upon these findings, exploring the underlying motivations behind regional differences and examining the potential impact of educational initiatives on consumer preferences. Additionally, addressing any limitations in the research methodology would refine the approach for subsequent studies.

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APPENDIX

Mixed logit results: Greece

Mixed logit mo	odel d = -1941.2674				Number of ob Wald chi2(3) Prob > chi2	s = 9,120 = 319.79 = 0.0000
		(S†	td. err.	adjusted	for 304 clust	ers in id)
choice	Coefficient	Robust std. err.	Z	P> z	[95% conf.	interval]
Mean						
price	6212715	.0448644	-13.85	0.000	7092041	5333389
closedist	3.826764	.2611268	14.65	0.000	3.314965	4.338563
nointermed	5.80469	.3286117	17.66	0.000	5.160623	6.448757
SD						
closedist	2.229831	.1693773	13.16	0.000	1.897858	2.561805
nointermed	2.193034	.1606411	13.65	0.000	1.878183	2.507885
ml				1		

The sign of the estimated standard deviations is irrelevant: interpret them as being positive

Mixed logit results: Spain

Mixed logit mo	del				Number of ob Wald chi2(3)	s = 8,880 = 332.91
Log likelihood	= -1884.1156	5			Prob > chi2	= 0.0000
		(St	d. err.	adjusted	for 296 clust	ers in id)
 choice	Coefficient	Robust std. err.	Z	P> z	[95% conf.	interval]
Mean						
price	6315703	.0490843	-12.87	0.000	7277738	5353669
closedist	6.199796	.3724931	16.64	0.000	5.469723	6.929869
nointermed	5.629941	.3372801	16.69	0.000	4.968884	6.290998
SD						
closedist	1.992363	.1576842	12.64	0.000	1.683307	2.301418
nointermed	2.237216	.1812488	12.34	0.000	1.881975	2.592457
The sign of th	The sign of the estimated standard deviations is irrelevant: interpret them as					

being positive

Mixed logit results: Algeria

Mixed logit model	Numbe	r of obs	=	9,300
	Wald	chi2(3)	=	74.57
Log likelihood = -3355.5395	Prob	> chi2	=	0.0000

(Std. err. adjusted for 310 clusters in id)

choice	 Coefficient	Robust std. err.	Z	₽> z	[95% conf.	interval]
Mean price closedist nointermed	0006726 .5895023 .4233624	.0003312 .0932391 .0920125	-2.03 6.32 4.60	0.042 0.000 0.000	0013218 .406757 .2430212	0000234 .7722475 .6037036
SD closedist nointermed	 .0020635 0009824	.0207182	0.10 -0.80	0.921 0.421	0385434 0033774	.0426704

The sign of the estimated standard deviations is irrelevant: interpret them as being positive $% \left({{{\left[{{{\left[{{{\left[{{{\left[{{{c}}} \right]}}} \right]_{i}}} \right]}_{i}}}} \right]_{i}} \right)$

Mixed logit results: Morocco

Mixed logit mo	odel				Number of ob Wald chi2(3)	s = 11,400 = 153.12
Log likelihood	d = -3976.3434				Prob > chi2	= 0.0000
		(Std.	err.	adjusted	for 380 clust	ers in id)
choice	 Coefficient	Robust std. err.	Z	P> z	[95% conf.	interval]
Mean price closedist nointermed	0063619 .8082733 .7775628	.0032872 .0875482 .0851842	-1.94 9.23 9.13	0.053 0.000 0.000	0128048 .6366821 .6106048	.000081 .9798646 .9445209
SD closedist nointermed	 .4077404 .5220897	.0829706 .0788173	4.91	0.000 0.000	.245121 .3676107	.5703598 .6765687



Experimental Instructions for the Auction










Today's 2nd Price Auction (continued)

• At the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly choose an offer for you. You can reduce it or increase it as you like. This is to facilitate your decision.

• You will have <u>a limited time</u> to change your offers. This will appear at the **top of** your screen. Time is sufficient to adjust your offer.

• You can also decide not to adjust the initial random bid, so <u>if time</u> <u>runs out</u>, that bid will be taken as your final decision.

Why be realistic?

• Offer bids for the jams according to what the jams really worth to you:

• If you offer <u>more</u> than you really want to offer, you may have to get a jam at a *higher price* than you would like,

• If you offer <u>less</u> than what you would really like to offer, thenyou will not be able to get the jam you like at a price that might beacceptable for you.

The result of today's auction • After the third round of the auction, the computer will randomly select the following: 1. one of the three rounds will be the binding round 2. <u>one of two types of</u> fig jams as the <u>binding</u> • As already explained, one participant from each group will be randomly selected: • this participant will receive the profits from the zero counting task. • Gets the jam only if s/he is the highest bidder in the auction for the jam. • Everyone else gets no profit from the zero counting work and doesn't pay for any of the jams. Examples of possible results of today's auction Bidder for Marmelada A **Binding auction** X € from the count of 0, Α TAKES Jam A !!! 1st round В Bidder for Marmalade B X € from the count of 0 **Binding auction** Α DOES NOT GET Jam A !!! 2nd round ぷ B Bidder for Marmalade B or Did not bid 3rd round -**Binding auction** В He receives participation compensation NOT only

Auction Phase:

- A practice auction now follows (for soaps) and then three rounds of auctions, for two types of jams in each round.
- The practice phase of the auction does not affect your final earnings.
- Plese read the instructions displayed on your screen carefully!



Screen captures for Auction and Choice Experiment (Greece and Spain)





I[Th decis Befo be cc we we	ere are no "right" or "wrong" decisions or answers in this study. Nevertheless, your actual income at the end will depend on your sions and the decisions of other participants. Our advice is to pay attention to the instructions. re we started, each one of you drew a three-digit number. This number is unique for each one of you, as well as for all sessions we will onducting. That is, this number is your ID since no other participant in this survey will have the same number as you. This is the number ill use to pay you at the end.
Ever end r vary]]	y participant receives a coupon of 30 EUR value for their presence here. For practical reasons, you will receive the coupon at the of the session and will be added to your additional income based on your decisions and random choice. The additional income may from 0 to 5 EUR.
	[beat so]
	[[INFORMED CONSENT]] [[Please read carefully the following information concerning the present study. You have to agree to continue.]]
[[Description]]: [[The present stud [[Aim of the study]]: [[This study. [[Funding for this research]]: [[There are can make up to 5€ on top to that.] [[Voluntary participation]]: [[You [[Right to Withdraw]]: [[You are f [[Right to ask questions]]: [[You	dy will last around 80 minutes. You will be asked to make decisions that will help us understand how people bid in a certain type of auction.]] explores how people make decisions regarding jam choice.]] his research is supervised by Andreas Drichoutis and is funded by a European project.]] e no anticipated risks to participating in the study. There are no other benefits than monetary earnings. You will receive a fixed amount of 30€ as your participation fees and you The amount of money you earn will depend on your decisions during the study and more details will be given with the instructions.]] r participation is voluntary.]] ree to refuse to participate in the research and to withdraw from this study at any time. Your decision to withdraw will bring no negative consequences to you.]] are free to ask questions about the study without any negative consequences to you.]]
	[[Continus >>]]





[[INFORMED CONSENT]]					
[[Please read carefully the following information concerning the present study. You have to agree to continue.]]					
[[Confidentiality]]: [[We will ask you to provide as with your name, sumame, your telephone number and email address that we need in order to make payments and print receipts. All information will be held in the strictest of confidence and according to national law and personal data protection laws. Results from the research will be reported as aggregate data and will be used for publications in international per reviewed journals. At the end of the research period, data will be retained by the researcher and will not be sold to a third party. Identifying information will be moved from the data and therefore only anonymized data can be shared with other researchers for reasons related to replication, re-analysis, or additional analysis.]] [[Informed Consent]]: [[I have read the description, including the purpose of the study, ne procedures to be used, the potential risks and benefits, the confidentiality, as well as the option to withdraw from the study at any time. Any queries I had, were answered by the investigator and I understand what is involved. I agree to the following: I have no kind of allergy to foods. I how no kind of allergy to foods. I do not receive any kind of redicine or medicial treatment that prevents me from sampling food. I will follow researchers' instructions on how to sample and taste food. My signature below indicates that I freely agree to participate in this study.]] [[I fy un have any other questions about this study, you can contact Dr. Zein Kalles at zein kallas@upc.edu]]					
		[[] << Back]j [[Continue >>]]			
([Pi	[[INFORMED	D CONSENT]]			
[[Piease type your first name]] [[Piease type your surname :]] [[Piease type your email address :]] [[Piease type your email address again :]]	Test Test@gnal.com Test@gnal.com	[[By clicking the button on the right, I agree and consent in participating in this study:]]			
		[[<< Back]]			



[[Please type the code you were given in the beginning of the session.]]
[[Hoat >>]]
[[This study consists of four different stages:
1. In stage one you will be asked to give the correct answer in a task.
In stage two you will participate in a series of auctions. In this stage you will also be asked to do sensory evaluations of two types of jams.
 In stage three you will be asked to make choices between hypothetical options of jams with different attributes. In stage four a guestionnaire will follow, consisting of simple guestions and scales
s, m suge rou a queanomente em romen, consisting or ampre queanons and sustea.
group and only that one person will be paid any additional earnings. If you are not selected, then you will only receive the coupon of 30 EUR.
After payment you will be free to leave the lab.]]
[bint >>]

[[In the ne a matrix o all particip selected By clickin additional	axt stage, all participants have of 0's and 1's. The matrix will pants albeit with different coun from your group, you will start the tri learnings.]]	to complete a zero counting show up 10 times. Its size (it its for 0%. Every time you give id these additional earnings. ial matrix for practicing countir	task. The task consists of det hat is, the number of rows and the correct answer, you accu ng zeros. After that, there will b	ermining the correct number of columns) will be the same eac mulate 0.50€ . If you are rando the 10 matrices from which you	f zeros in h time for mfy can make
					[[Remaining time [sec]:]] 10
	[[PRACTICE Round]]				
	0	0	1	1	
	1	1	0	U	
	1	1	1	٥	
	0	0	0	1	
		Please court the number of zeros in the mo	droc]] 🦳 💐	[Next >>]	

r		1
		[[Remaining time [sec]:]] 10
[[PRA	CTICE Round]]	
	[[Your answer was:]] 3	
	[[The correct answer was:]] 8	
	[Contrue >>]	
		[[Remaining time [sec]:]] 4
	INTENTION: The zero counting tack is about to start!!!	





					[[Remaining time [sec]]] 14	
	[[Round 1 of]] 10					
	1	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	1		
	1	1	1	1		
	ũ	1	1	1		
	[[Please cout the number of zeros in the matric] 3 [] [Bleas avg]					
[Remaining time [see]] 2						
[[Round 1 of]] 10						
		[[Your answer v	vas:]] er was:]]	7		
				[[Continue >>]]		





[[We now would like you to answer some questions that are meant to review the rules of the auctions.]]		
[[1. How many people can get an opportunity to buy the product in an auction round?	1	
[[2. Suppose you bid 2.30 and the other participants bid 1.20, 1.80, 1.75.]]		
[[2a. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? I[2b. What is the price the highest bidder pays in the auction?	(• [[Me]] C [[Someone else from my group]] C 1.20	
Ten una na hue na aidean nach haben na annan	(1.75 (1.80 (2.30	
[[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95.]]		
[[3a. Who is the highest bidder in the auction?]] C [[Me]] (iii [[Someone else from my group]] (iiii [] Someone else from my group]]	
Lio. what is the price the highest bidder pays in the auction;	C 1.60 (1.55) (1.55)	
	C 2.30	
		[[Continue >>]]
[[We now would like you to answer some questions that are meant to review the rules of the auctions.]]		
[[4a. How many persons can potentially purchase Jam A in an auction	group?]] 1	
[[4b. If you are not the highest bidder, how much money are you expected to spend	on jam?]] 1	
		[[<< Back]] IIContinue >>1]



[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]]		
[[1. How many people can get an opportunity to buy the product in an auction round? You answered:]] [[Answer: In any given round of the auction only 1 person from each group can get the product. This person is the highest bidder.]]	1	
[[2. Suppose you bid 2.30 and the other participants bid 1.20, 1.80, 1.75.]]	G IB403	
[[28. Who is the highest block in the highest block in the auction is you.]]	C [[Someone else from my group]]	
[[2b. What is the price the highest bidder pays in the auction? You answered:]]	C 1.20 @ 1.75	
[[Answer: The highest bidder in this example will pay the second highest price, that is 1.80 euro.]]	C 1.80 C 2.30	
		[[Continue >>]]
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]]		
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]] [[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95.]] [[3a. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? You answered 1]	⊂ [Mo]]	
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]] [[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95.]] [[3e. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? You answered:]] [[Answer: You didn't offer the highest bid. Someone else offered 2.30 euro while you offered 1.50 euro. Therefore, you are not the highest bidder	C []Ma]] G []Seneces else ton my grav] In the auction.]]	
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]] [[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95.]] [[3e. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? You answered.]] [[Answer: You didn't offer the highest bid. Someone else offered 2.30 euro while you offered 1.50 euro. Therefore, you are not the highest bidder [[3b. What is the price the highest bidder pays in the auction? You answered.]]	C []Ma]] G []Someons dies from my group] In the auction,]] C 1 50 C 1 50	
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]] [[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95.]] [[3a. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? You answered.]] [[Answer: You didn't offer the highest bid. Someone else offered 2.30 euro while you offered 1.50 euro. Therefore, you are not the highest bidder [[3b. What is the price the highest bidder pays in the auction? You answered.]] [[Answer: The highest bidder in this example, will pay the price of the second highest bidder, that is the price of 1.95 euro.]]	C [[Ma]] C [[Bencons else from my group] in the autoin.]] C 1.50 C 1.50 C 1.55 C 2.50	
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]] [[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95.]] [[3a. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? You answered.]] [[Answer: You didn't offer the highest bid. Someone else offered 2.30 euro while you offered 1.50 euro. Therefore, you are not the highest bidder [[3b. What is the price the highest bidder pays in the auction? You answered.]] [[Answer: The highest bidder in this example, will pay the price of the second highest bidder, that is the price of 1.95 euro.]] [[4a. How many persons can potentially purchase Jam A in an auction group? You answered.]]	С [[M4]] G [[Senecies des forn my group] in the auction.]] С 150 С 160 с 160 с 2.30	
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]] [[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95.]] [[3a. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? You answered]] [[4nswer: You didn't offer the highest bid. Someone else offered 2.30 euro while you offered 1.50 euro. Therefore, you are not the highest bidder [[3b. What is the price the highest bidder pays in the auction? You answered]] [[Answer: The highest bidder in this example, will pay the price of the second highest bidder, that is the price of 1.95 euro.]] [[4a. How many persons can potentially purchase Jam A in an auction group? You answered]] [[4nswer: From each group there is only one highest bidder, therefore only 1 person from each group may purchase the jam.]]	C [][44]] G []Sameare das forn my group]] in the auction.]] C 150 C 150 C 2.30	
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]] [[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95.]] [[3a. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? You answered:]] [[4. How want offer the highest bidder pays in the auction? You answered:]] [[Answer: The highest bidder in this example, will pay the price of the second highest bidder, that is the price of 1.95 euro.]] [[4a. How many persons can potentially purchase Jam A in an auction group? You answered:]] [[4nswer: From each group there is only one highest bidder, therefore only 1 person from each group may purchase the jam.]] [[4nswer: If you are not the highest bidder, you will not purchase any jam, so you are expected to pay 0 euros for jams.]]	C [][44]] G []Seneces das forn my group]] in the auction.]] C 150 C 150 C 230 1 1	
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]] [[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95,]] [[3a. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? You answered.]] [[Answer: You didn't offer the highest bid. Someone else offered 2.30 euro while you offered 1.50 euro. Therefore, you are not the highest bidder [[3b. What is the price the highest bidder pays in the auction? You answered.]] [[Answer: The highest bidder in this example, will pay the price of the second highest bidder, that is the price of 1.95 euro.]] [[4a. How many persons can potentially purchase Jam A in an auction group? You answered.]] [[Answer: From each group there is only one highest bidder, therefore only 1 person from each group may purchase the jam.]] [[4b. If you are not the highest bidder, how much money are you expected to spend on jam? You answered.]] [[Answer: If you are not the highest bidder, you will not purchase any jam, so you are expected to pay 0 euros for jams.]]	С []40] 6 []Senece due ten my group] in the auction.]] С 150 7 160 6 155 7 2.30 1	
[[Below you can see an explanation of the right answers.]] [[3. Suppose you bid 1.50 and the other participants bid 1.60, 2.30, 1.95.]] [[3. Who is the highest bidder in the auction? You answered.]] [[Answer: You didn't offer the highest bid. Someone else offered 2.30 euro while you offered 1.50 euro. Therefore, you are not the highest bidder [[3b. What is the price the highest bidder pays in the auction? You answered.]] [[Answer: The highest bidder in this example, will pay the price of the second highest bidder, that is the price of 1.95 euro.]] [[4a. How many persons can potentially purchase Jam A in an auction group? You answered.]] [[Answer: From each group there is only one highest bidder, therefore only 1 person from each group may purchase the jam.]] [[4b. If you are not the highest bidder, how much money are you expected to spend on jam? You answered.]] [[Answer: If you are not the highest bidder, you will not purchase any jam, so you are expected to pay 0 euros for jams.]]	C [[M4]] G [[Sension any group]] in the auction.]] C 150 C 160 C 200 f 100	



[[in the next screen y	ou will see pictures of jams. You will be asked to evaluate the	e jams based on your expectations built on the pictures alone.
After you complete et	valuation of the jams, you will participate in an auction to purch	hase a jar of each of the jams. Click 'Continue' to proceed.]]
[[You can now see pictures of two different jams. Plea [Jam A] [Jam B]]	Ise carefully look at the pictures and answer the following que [[Just judging from appearance, what is your evaluation for Jam A9 (choose from the horizontal bar)] [Just judging from appearance, what is your evaluation for Jam B9 (choose from the horizontal bar)]	istions.]]



[[Remaining time	to bet jj 32	
Dateg [//e you sure you want to finalize y	Are ber?] Ves No	
[[Round]] 1 [[Number of people in your auction group]] 1 [[Your current bid is (in Euros)]] 2.58	[[Round]] 1 [[Number of people in your auction group]] 1 [[Year current bid is (in Eures)]] 1.38	
Παι πο α <th .<="" th=""><th>J.d. .40 a .40 5.d. .50 a .50 -1.d. -1.00 a .40 -1.5 a .50 a .40</th></th>	<th>J.d. .40 a .40 5.d. .50 a .50 -1.d. -1.00 a .40 -1.5 a .50 a .40</th>	J.d. .40 a .40 5.d. .50 a .50 -1.d. -1.00 a .40 -1.5 a .50 a .40
[[Remaining line	to bet]] 4	
[[Jam A]]	[[Jam B]]	
[[How certain are you for your bid for Jam A?]] [[Somewhat uncertain]] Completing Remellence uncertaing	[[How certain are you for your bid for Jam B?]] [[Quite certain]] [Complete working] [Complete working]	
I Com	nue »>]]	

[[We will now provid [[Jam A]] [[is produ [[Jam B]] [[is produ [[In the next screen, : [[After you complete	e you with some information about the jams.]] red at a closer distance to here]] red at a closer distance to here]] rou will be asked to evaluate the jams.]] evaluation of the jams, you will participate in an auction to pur	chase a jar of each of the jams. Click 'Continue' to proceed.]]			
	Continue >>				
[[Jam A]] [[is produced at a closer distance to here]]. [[J	am B]] [[is produced at a closer distance to here]]				
(Jam A)	[[What is your evaluation for Jam A? (choose from the homzontal bar]]	[[closes:]] [[Disike slighty]] ([Disike slighty]] ([Externely (Disike lighty]] ([Externely (Disike lighty]] ([Disike lig			
(Jam B)	[[What is your evaluation for Jam B? (choose from the horizontal bar)]	[[choose]] [[Like very much]] [[Coteney []Disite moderately] []Disite nor disite] []Like []Like []Enteney []Enteney [] very much]] suptry] suptry] very much]			
		[Continue to]			



[[Remaining time to bid]] 30				
[[This jam]] [[is produced at a closer distance to here]]	[[This jam]] [[is produced at a closer distance to here]]			
Wind de proximitat	Ford of the second seco			
u	[[Jam A]]			
[[Round]] 2 [Number of people in your acction group]	[[Round]] 2 [[humber of people in your acction group]] 1			
[[Your current bid is (in Europ):]] 1.00	[[Your current bid is (in Euros)]] 2 04			
(Fin	instize my bid >>g			
5 ct .50 ct .50	5 ct 50 ct 5%			
+5 a +50 a +5€	+5 ct +90 ct +96			
	[Remaining time to bid.]] 10			
[[This jam]] [[is produced at a closer distance to here]]	[[This jam]] [[is produced at a closer distance to here]]			
Vind de proximiter				
<u> </u>	[[Jam A]]			
[[How certain are you for your bid for Jam A?]]	[[How certain are you for your bid for Jam B?]]			
[[Quite				
certain]]	[[Certain]]			
ICompletely ICompletely	ICompatibility IIConnected by			
unanung (Mang	watung datang			
	II Cantus >> II			











[[Remaining time to bid]] 8				
[[This jam]] [[is produced at a closer distance to here]]	[[This jam]] [[is produced at a closer distance to here]]			
(Jam A]]	(Jan B)			
[[How certain are you for your bid for Jam A?]] [[Neither certain, nor uncertain]] 	[[How certain are you for your bid for Jam B?]] [[Neither certain, nor uncertain] [Completity uncertain] Uncertaing			
[[In the next screens you will be asked to select between fig jams with different attributes and prices. Please select your most preferred option by carefully looking at the available options. For each choice card, please indicate whether you prefer Jam A, Jam B or none of them. These options are completely hypothetical so your choices are completely hypothetical as well. Thus, no money or products will be exchanged at this stage.]]				
	a			























[[The three rounds of iam auctions and evaluations have ended. The sur	vev questions and scales follow.]]	
[[Out of the three auction rounds, the computer selected n [[Out of the two jams, the computer selected Ja	ound number:]] 3 im:]] B	
	-	
[[You are one of the selected subjects for receiving the money from the Matrix task and	d purchasing the Jam based on your bidding.]]	
[[You will receive 3.50 EUR from the Matrix counting task on top to you	ur endowment of]] 30.00 EUR.	
[[You had the highest bid and will buy one jar of Jam B and the price of 0.00EUR will be deducted from your additional earnings.]]		
[Your final payoff is: 3.50 EUR on top to the 30 EUR coupon]]		
	[[Continue >>]]	
[[Please type your birth year (e.g., 1978).]]	1999	
[[Please type your gender.]]	C [[Conten]] C [[Conten]]	
[[How many people are in your household including yourself?]]	2	
[[What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?]]	C [[Primary school]]	
	te []secondary school oegree or equivalent]] ← [[Bachelos' degree]] ← [[Master's degree]]	
	C [[Doctorate]]	
[[How would you evaluate the income position of your household?]]	C [[Very bad] C [[Bad]] C [[Neither good, nor bad]]	
	(^ [[Good]] @ [[Very good]]	
[[What is your current working status?]]	C [[Employed full-time]] C [[Employed part-time]]	
	C [[Unemployed] ([[Studen]]) C [[Retired]]	
	C [[Self-employed]] C [[Unable to work]]	
	[[Next>>]]	



[[How do you see yourself: are you a person who is generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please use the scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means you are "completely unwilling to take risks" and 10 means you are "very willing to take risks".]] [[0=Completely unwilling]] CCCC@CCCCC [[10=Very willing]] [In comparison to others, are you a person who is generally willing to give up something today in order to the inft from that in the future or are you not willing to do so? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means you are "completely unwilling to give up something today" and a 10 means you are "very willing to give up something today".]] [IP-Completely unwilling] CCCC @ CCCCC [[10-Way willing]] [[How well does the following statement describe you as a person? As long as I am not convinced otherwise, I assume that people have only the best intentions. Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means does not describe me at all" and a 10 means "describes me perfectly".]] [[0=Does not describe me]] CCCCCCCC[[10=Describes me perfectly]] [[How do you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting anything in return when it comes to charity or good causes? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are "completely unwilling to share" and a 10 means you are "very willing to share"...]] tely unwilling]] CCCCCCCCC [[10=Very willing]] [[imagine the following situation: you won 1,000 Euro in a lottery. Considering your current situation, how much would you donate to a charity or good cause? (Integer values between 0 and 1000 are allowed)]] 24 [[Next >>]] [[Imagine the following situation: you are shopping in an unfamiliar city and realize you lost your way. You ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to take you with their car to your destination. The ride takes about 20 minutes and costs the stranger about 20 Euro in total. The stranger does not want money for it. You carry six bottles of wine with you. The cheapest bottle costs 5 Euro, the most expensive one 30 Euro. You decide to give one of the bottles to the stranger as thank-you gitt. Which bottle do you give?]] ○ [[Bottle of 5€]]
 ○ [[Bottle of 10€]]
 ○ [[Bottle of 15€]]
 ○ [[Bottle of 20€]]
 ○ [[Bottle of 25€]]
 ○ [[Bottle of 30€]] [[When someone does me a favor, I'm willing to return it.]] [[0=Does not describe me]] CCCCCCCCC [[10=0 bes me perfectly]] [[How well does the following statement describe you as a person? If I am treated very undjustly, I will take revenge at the first occasion, even if there is a cost to do so. Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means does not describe me at all" and a 10 means "describes me perfectly".]] [[0=Does not describe me]] (CCCCCCC ([10=Describes me perfectly]] [[Next >>]]

ier are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even no characteristic applies more strongly than the other.]			
[[1. Extraverte	ad, enthusiastic]] ្ពា ្លា ្លា ្លា ្រ ្ ្រ ្ ្ េ ្ ា ្ ា ា ្ ្ ា ា ា ្ ្ ា ា ា ា ា	[Strongly disagree]] [Disagree moderately]] [Neither ages, nor disagree]] Appee moderately]] [Appee Strongh]]	
[[2: Critical, q	uarrelsome]]	(Stongly disagree)] Disagree moderately]] Disaber aprese (Disaber aprese) Disaber aprese (Disaber aprese)] Aprese attel] (Aprese Strengly]]	
[[3. Dependal	ble, self-disciplined]] (미 이미 이미 야민 야민 이미 야민 이미 이미 이미 이미 이미 이미 이미 이미 이미 이미 이미 이미 이미	[Strongly desayes] [Disager enderate/b][Disager enderate/b][Agree attibut] Agree motareb/]] Agree Strong/]]	
			[[Next >>]]
[[Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.]]			
[[4. Anxious, eas	ily upset]]	[[Stonply disagrae]] [[Diagree moderate]] [[Diagree moderate]] [[Indepre ating] [[Indepre ating] [[Aprea moderate]] [[Aprea moderate]] [[Aprea moderate]] [[Aprea moderate]]	
[[5. Open to new	experiences, complex]]	[[Stooply disagree]] [[Disagree moderate/]] [[Disagree moderate/]] [[Inderse moderate/]] [[Inderse moderate/]] [[Aprex moderate/]] [[Aprex moderate/]] [[Aprex moderate/]]	
∐6. Reserved. qu	Jiet]]	C [[Soongly disagree]] ([Disagree modurate/j]) ([Disabre agree: codespee]] ([Johdre agree: codespee]] ([Johdree street,j]) ([Jogree Strongly]]	
			[[Vext >>]]



[[Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.]]		
[[7. Sympathetic, warm]]	['[Istrangly disagree]] ['[Istrangly disagree]] ['[Istrangly argument disagree]] ['[Istrangle argument disagree]] ['[Istrangle argument disagree]] ['[Istrangle argument disagree]]	
[[8. Disorganized, careless]]	C [[Shravdy disagnet] # [[Disagnet moderate]] ([Disagnet million ([Disagnet million C [Idignet moderate]) C [Idignet Stordy]] C [Idignet Stordy]]	
	[[cc;saf]]	
[[Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you fone characteristic applies more strongly than the other.]]	agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even	
[[9. Calm, emotionally stable]]		
[[10. Conventional, uncreative] ([Strugly disayen] ([Strugly disayer molecter]] ([Strugly disayer molecter]] ([Appen strug] ([Appen Strug]] ([Appen Strug]]	
	[[Next>>]]	







Screen captures for Choice Experiment (Algeria and Morocco)



* Êtes-vous d'accord?

○ J'accepte et consens à participer à cette étude

○ Je ne suis PAS d'accord pour participer à cette étude


Etude sur la prise de décision **«Kana**research concernant les confitures

Dans les écrans suivants, il vous sera demandé de choisir entre des confitures de figues avec différents attributs et prix. Veuillez sélectionner votre option préférée en examinant attentivement les options disponibles.

Pour chaque carte au choix, veuillez indiquer si vous préférez le confiture à gauche, le confiture à droite ou aucun d'entre eux. Ces options sont complètement hypothétiques, donc vos choix sont également complètement hypothétiques.

Choix 1



- Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède
- O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

Choix 2



* Choix 2

○ Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) ○ Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède

O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

Choix 3



- Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède
- O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

Choix 4



* Choix 4

○ Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) ○ Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède

O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

Choix 5



- Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède
- O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

Choix 6



- Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède
- O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

Choix 7



- Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède
- O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

Choix 8



- Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède
- O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

Choix 9



- Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède
- O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

Choix 10



- Je préfère la confiture à gauche (500 gr) Je ne préfère rien de ce qui précède
- O Je préfère la confiture à droite (500 gr)



Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures						
* Veuillez saisir votr	e année de naissance (par exemple, 1978)					
* Veuillez saisir vo	tre sexe					
OHomme						
○ Femme						
Autre						
compris?						
* Quel est le diplôr ayez obtenu?	ne ou le niveau d'études le plus élevé que vous					
 Diplôme d'études se 	econdaires ou équivalent					
 licence 						
🔿 Une maîtrise						
ODoctorat						
* Comment évalue ménage?	z-vous la situation des revenus de votre					
🔵 Très mauvais						
◯ Mauvais						
🔵 Ni bonne ni mauvais	se					
⊖ Bien						
🔵 Très bien						

* Quel est votre statut professionnel actuel?

- 🔵 Employé à temps complet
- 🔵 Employé à temps partiel
- \bigcirc Sans emploi
-) Étudiant
- \bigcirc À la retraite
- O Travailleur indépendant
- \bigcirc Incapable de travailler

* Quelle est votre région de résidence?



Etude sur la prise de décision



tout" et un 10 signifie "me décrit parfaitement" .

0 5 10

* Comment évaluez-vous votre volonté de partager avec les autres sans rien attendre en retour lorsqu'il s'agit de charité ou de bonnes causes ? Veuillez utiliser une échelle de 0 à 10, où un 0 signifie que vous êtes "totalement réticent à partager" et un 10 signifie que vous êtes "tout à fait disposé à partager".

10

5

* Imaginez la situation suivante : vous avez gagné 150 000 dinars à une loterie. Compte tenu de votre situation actuelle, combien donneriez-vous à un organisme de bienfaisance ou à une bonne cause ? (Les valeurs entières entre 0 et 150 000 sont autorisées)

* Imaginez la situation suivante : vous faites vos courses dans une ville inconnue et réalisez que vous vous êtes égaré. Vous demandez votre chemin à un inconnu. L'inconnu vous propose de vous emmener avec sa voiture jusqu'à votre destination. Le trajet dure environ 20 minutes et coûte à l'étranger environ 3 000 dinars au total. L'étranger ne veut pas d'argent pour cela. Vous portez six bouteilles de miel avec vous. La bouteille la moins chère coûte 750 dinars, la plus chère 4 500 Dirhams. Vous décidez d'offrir une des bouteilles à l'inconnu en guise de remerciement. Quelle bouteille offrez-vous ?

O Bouteille de 750 dinars

0

- O Bouteille de 1500 dinars
- O Bouteille de 2250 dinars
- O Bouteille de 3000 dinars
- 🔘 Bouteille de 3750 dinars
- O Bouteille de 4500 dinars

* Dans quelle mesure l'énoncé suivant vous décrit-il en tant que personne ? Quand quelqu'un me fait une faveur, je suis prêt à lui rendre. Veuillez utiliser une échelle de 0 à 10, où 0 signifie "ne me décrit pas du tout" et 10 signifie "me décrit parfaitement".

0 = Ne me décrit pas10 = Me décritdu tout5parfaitement

* Êtes-vous une personne qui est généralement disposée à punir un comportement déloyal même si cela coûte cher ? Veuillez utiliser une échelle de 0 à 10, où 0 signifie que vous êtes « totalement réticent à engager des frais pour punir un comportement déloyal » et 10 signifie que vous êtes « très disposé à engager des frais pour punir un comportement déloyal ».

0 = Complètement réticent 5 10 = Très disposé

* Dans quelle mesure l'énoncé suivant vous décrit-il en tant que personne ? Si je suis traité très injustement, je me vengerai à la première occasion, même si cela a un coût. Veuillez utiliser une échelle de 0 à 10, où 0 signifie "ne me décrit pas du tout" et 10 signifie "me décrit parfaitement".

 0 = Ne me décrit pas
 10 = Me décrit

 du tout
 5
 parfaitement

Voici un certain nombre de traits de personnalité qui peuvent ou non s'appliquer à vous. Veuillez indiquer dans quelle mesure vous êtes d'accord ou en désaccord avec cette affirmation. Vous devez évaluer dans quelle mesure la paire de traits s'applique à vous, même si une caractéristique s'applique plus fortement que l'autre.

* Traits de personnalité: Ni d'accord Pas du tout Être en Plutôt en ni en Plutôt Tout à fait d'accord désaccord désaccord désaccord d'accord Accepter d'accord Extraverti, enthousiaste Critique, querelleur Fiable, autodiscipliné Anxieux, \bigcirc facilement bouleversé Ouvert à de nouvelles expériences, complexe Réservé, calme Sympathique, chaleureux Désorganisé, négligent Calme, émotionnellement stable Conventionnel, non créatif

Etude sur la prise de décision concernant les confitures

* Vous aimez la confiture ?

- \bigcirc Je n'aime pas du tout
- \bigcirc Je n'aime pas un peu
- 🔘 Ni aimer, ni détester
- ◯ J'aime un peu
- \bigcirc J'aime beaucoup

* Quel type de petit-déjeuner consommez-vous habituellement ?

- Sucré (ex. fruits, confiture, miel, tartinades)
- Salé (ex. œufs, jambon, fromage)
- 🔵 Juste du café
- 🔘 Pas de petit déjeuner du tout

* A quelle fréquence consommez-vous des confitures ?

○ Rarement ou jamais

- \bigcirc Une fois par mois
- ◯ 1 à 2 fois/semaine
- ◯ 3-4 fois/semaine
- ◯ Tous les jours

* Les confitures ont été caractérisées dans la littérature comme des produits à haute valeur nutritionnelle mais en même temps avec une forte teneur en sucre, ce qui les rend malsains pour le consommateur. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord ou pas d'accord avec ce point de vue ?

- O Pas du tout d'accord
- Pas d'accord modérément
- Pas d'accord un peu
- 🔘 Ni d'accord ni en désaccord
- \bigcirc D'accord un peu
- O'accord modérément
- ◯ Tout à fait d'accord

Veuillez considérer cette définition pour répondre aux questions suivantes : une "chaîne d'approvisionnement courte" est une chaîne d'approvisionnement impliquant un nombre limité d'opérateurs économiques, engagés dans la coopération, le développement économique local et des relations géographiques et sociales étroites entre producteurs, transformateurs et consommateurs de denrées alimentaires.

* Acheter de la nourriture en Circuits Courts Alimentaires, c'est...

- O Pas gratifiant du tout
- O Pas gratifiant
- 🔘 Ni pas gratifiant, ni gratifiant
- ◯ Gratifiant
- Très gratifiant

* Acheter de la nourriture en Circuits Courts Alimentaires, c'est...

- 🔿 Très déplaisant
- O Désagréable
- 🔘 Ni désagréable, ni agréable
- O Agréable
- 🔿 Très agréable

* Acheter de la nourriture en Circuits Courts Alimentaires, c'est...

- 🔿 Pas du tout satisfaisant
- O Pas satisfaisant
- 🔘 Ni insatisfaisant, ni satisfaisant
- Satisfaisant
- 🔿 Très satisfaisant

Veuillez considérer cette définition pour répondre aux questions suivantes : une "chaîne d'approvisionnement courte" est une chaîne d'approvisionnement impliquant un nombre limité d'opérateurs économiques, engagés dans la coopération, le développement économique local et des relations géographiques et sociales étroites entre producteurs, transformateurs et consommateurs de denrées alimentaires.

* Veuillez indiquer dans quelle mesure vous êtes d'accord ou pas d'accord avec chacun des énoncés suivants :

	Pas du tout d'accord	Plutôt en désaccord	Ni d'accord ni en désaccord	Plutôt d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
J'ai l'intention d'acheter de la nourriture auprès de circuits courts d'approvisionnement alimentaire au cours du mois prochain	0	0	0	0	0
Je prévois d'acheter de la nourriture auprès de circuits courts d'approvisionnement alimentaire au cours du mois prochain	0	0	0	0	0
Je suis prêt à acheter de la nourriture de circuits courts d'approvisionnement alimentaire au cours du mois prochain	0	0	0	0	0